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APPELLATE PROCEDURE-ORDERS DISQUALIFYING COUNSEL
ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE UNDER THE COLLATERAL ORDER
EXCEPTION TO 28 U.S.C. SECTION 1291. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v.
Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985).
Anne Koller was born in 1979 without normal arms or legs. In
May, 1980, Anne's parents filed suit against Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
the maker of the anti-nausea drug Bendectin, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia. The Kollers alleged that
Bendectin ingested by Anne's mother during the first trimester of her
pregnancy caused Anne's severe limb malformations. Prior to trial, the
defendant moved to disqualify the lead law firm representing the
Kollers. 1
The critical issues in the case, which emerged from more than two
years of discovery, were whether Anne's mother actually took Bendec-
tin during the crucial first trimester of pregnancy, and whether the
drug was capable of causing birth defects. The defendant alleged sepa-
rate incidents of attorney misconduct involving both of these issues.
One of the Kollers' attorneys conducted an interview with the Wash-
ington Post concerning the case, and released inadmissible "Drug Ex-
perience Reports" to the newspaper.2 Another attorney allegedly at-
tempted to thwart the investigation of a witness.3 The district court
revoked the pro hac vice appearances of the lead firm, indicating that
the Kollers' other counsel could provide competent representation."
The Kollers appealed the disqualification to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellate
court reversed the disqualification order.5 The court characterized or-
1. The Kollers were originally represented by a Miami law firm and local counsel in Wash-
ington. As discovery progressed, the Los Angeles firm of Butler, Jefferson, Dan & Allis took the
lead in trial preparation. James Butler and Nicholas Allis were admitted pro hac vice to appear in
the case.
2. The district court had issued a pretrial ruling excluding collateral evidence relating to
children who had birth defects like Anne's.
3. The witness was the attorney's secretary, who twice called the defendant's attorneys and
indicated that the suit was fraudulent because Anne's mother had not taken Bendectin during the
decisive early months of her pregnancy. The Kollers' attorney subsequently secured his secretary's
signature on a typed statement denying her earlier assertion. The secretary later recanted this
statement.
4. The district court concluded that conduct that falls short of violation of a Disciplinary
Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility may be sufficiently impermissible to warrant revo-
cation of pro hac vice appearances.
5. Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pro hac vice counsel,
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ders disqualifying counsel as part of that narrow class of exceptions to
the final judgment rule for which immediate review is appropriate
under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.'
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals' decision on jurisdiction over the interlocutory ap-
peal. The Court held that disqualification orders are not immediately
appealable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment
principle of Title 28, section 1291 of the United States Code. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985).
The requirement of a final judgment before appeal is a fundamen-
tal characteristic of the federal judicial system.7 The roots of the prin-
ciple are in the common law of England.' The requirement may have
been based on the idea that the record of a case could not be in two
places at once. 9 Imported to the United States, the final judgment rule
was incorporated into the Judiciary Act of 1789.10 American courts
quickly embraced the concept,11 and found policy justification for the
common law formality. 2 The requirement was adopted for the newly
created circuit courts of appeal in 1891.13 In the same year, the Su-
preme Court rejected an expanded role in interlocutory appeals for the
nation's highest court.14 By 1940, the final judgment rule was regarded
by Justice Frankfurter as a "means of achieving a healthy legal sys-
tem." 15 In its American incarnation, the principle has been aimed at
prevention of the expense and delay of piecemeal review, with the addi-
once admitted, are not more readily subject to disqualification than are regularly admitted
counsel).
6. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
7. 9 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 110.06 (2d ed. 1985) (the principle is the
dominant rule of federal appellate procedure).
8. See Metcalfe's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1615) (no writ of error lies until the whole
matter is determined); Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539
(1932).
9. Crick, supra note 8, at 542.
10. 1 STAT. 73 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)).
11. Crick, supra note 8, at 550 n.56 (the American reception of the rule may reflect the post-
Revolution emphasis on laying down rules of law for the fledgling judicial system, and a corre-
sponding reluctance to deal with intermediate appeals) (citing Pound, Organization of Courts, 6
BULL. AM. JUD. Soc. 1 (1916)).
12. See, e.g., Canter v. Am. Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307, 318 (1830) (review of cases in
fragments would produce "very great delays and oppressive expenses.").
13. 26 STAT. 826, ch. 517 (1891) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)).
14. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665 (1891) (legislation governing judiciary reflects the
"well settled and ancient rule" against appeal before final judgment, saving the expense and delay
of repeated appeals).
15. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 326 (1940).
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tional consequence of sustaining the authority of the trial court. 16
Whatever the merits of the rule, the United States Supreme Court
has declined to raise an impenetrable barrier to review before a final
judgment. 17 In the early case, the Court rejected a strict application of
the requirement in favor of "reasonable construction." 8 Later, the
Court perceived a "penumbral area" of the final judgment concept,
which required flexibility in application. 19
A definite class of exceptions to the rule began to take shape in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.20 The case involved a stock-
holder's derivative action under a New Jersey statute that required
plaintiffs in such cases to give security for the reasonable expenses of
the defendants. The district court did not require the plaintiffs to post
security. The Supreme Court held that review on this point was proper
because the order was a "final disposition of a claimed right which is
not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require considera-
tion with it."'21 The Court pointed out that such exceptions would be
limited, however:
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally deter-
mine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted
in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent
of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated.
2
The Court explained the collateral order exception further in Ei-
sen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,23 which involved a class action on behalf
of all odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Exchange over a certain
four-year period. Several brokerage firms were alleged to have violated
antitrust and securities laws. The Court held that the district court
16. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3907
(1976).
17. See generally Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L. REV. 292
(1966); Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLuM. L.
REV. 89 (1975); Note, Toward a More Rational Final Judgment Rule: A Proposal to Amend 28
U.S.C. § 1292, 67 GEo. L.J. 1025 (1979); Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 351 (1961).
18. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848) (order directing defendant to im-
mediately deliver property to assignee in bankruptcy, although not final, was appealable).
19. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124-26 (1945) (order of highest
state court directing immediate delivery of physical property is subject to interlocutory review by
the United States Supreme Court).
20. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
21. Id. at 546-47.
22. Id. at 546.
23. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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could not properly impose ninety percent of the cost of notice to 2.25
million class members on the defendants, even though assessing the
costs to the plaintiffs would result in dismissal of the suit. The threat to
the defendants' rights from the collateral order made interlocutory re-
view permissible."' Justice Powell, for the majority, acknowledged a
balancing element in the Court's approach to the collateral order ex-
ception. He wrote, "The inquiry requires some evaluation of the com-
peting considerations underlying all questions of finality-'the inconve-
nience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of
denying justice by delay on the other.' "25 The Court concluded that
the exception required, at a minimum, a final district court decision on
a matter unrelated to the merits.
2 6
The Court wove the principles of its previous decisions into the
fabric of a three-part test in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay.27 Accord-
ing to that decision, an order justifying interlocutory review must (1)
conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the case, and (3) be effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.2 8 The Court held
that a district court's decertification of a suit as a class action was not
immediately reviewable. Immediate review was improper in spite of the
fact that such an order might sound the "death knell" of the litigation
by removing the financial incentive of a possible group recovery. 9 The
Court noted that the order was subject to revision by the district court,
and thus inherently tentative, rather than conclusively determined.30
The Court also indicated that class action certification questions are
inextricable from the issues of the plaintiffs' cause of action."1 Finally,
such orders are subject to review following a final judgment in the
case.
3 2
In addition to applying the three-part test, the Court discussed and
rejected the view that the economic impact of a decision should enter
24. Id. at 172.
25. Id. at 171 (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)).
26. 417 U.S. at 172; see also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 3911 (1976).
27. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
28. Id. at 468.
29. Id. at 470. See also Cohen, "Not Dead But Only Sleeping;" The Rejection of the Death
Knell Doctrine and the Survival of Class Actions Denied Certification, 59 B.U.L. REv. 257
(1979); Note, A Final Tolling of the Death Knell: The Doctrine, Its Demise and Current Alterna-
tive Methods of Appeal of Class Certification Orders, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 668 (1979).
30. 437 U.S. at 469.
31. Id. at 469 n.12.
32. Id. at 469.
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into the determination of its appealability under the collateral order
exception. Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, maintained
that formulating an appealability rule based on the amount in question
would clearly be a legislative function. 3
The Court first applied the Coopers & Lybrand test to attorney
disqualification orders in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord.
3 4
Risjord was lead counsel for the plaintiffs in products liability litigation
against Firestone. Firestone moved to disqualify Risjord because the
attorney occasionally represented the tire manufacturer's liability car-
rier. The district court allowed Risjord to continue, with the consent of
the plaintiffs and the carrier. Firestone appealed, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the order denying disqual-
ification was not immediately reviewable.3 5
The United States Supreme Court agreed, holding that denial of a
motion to disqualify is not subject to immediate review. 6 Applying the
Coopers & Lybrand test, the Court conceded that a refusal to disqual-
ify counsel would conclusively determine the disputed question, satisfy-
ing the first part of the test.37 Without deciding, the Court assumed
that such an issue would be separate from the merits of the case, thus
meeting the second requirement.3 8 The third part of the test proved
dispositive; orders refusing to disqualify counsel were not deemed to be
effectively unreviewable on appeal of a final judgment.3 9 Notwithstand-
ing Firestone's contention that the trial would be "tainted" by Risjord's
participation, the Court chose to strictly construe the requirement that
the decision be unreviewable after final judgment. Interlocutory review
was said to be appropriate "'where denial of immediate review would
render impossible any review whatsoever.' ",40 The Court indicated that
denial of disqualification "will rarely, if ever, represent a final rejection
33. Id. at 472.
34. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
35. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980).
36. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). The circuit court had made its decision prospective only, since it
overruled prior cases in the circuit. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals could not
properly limit the effect of its decision on jurisdiction in the case to future litigation. Id. at 379.
See also Note, Civil Procedure-Interlocutory Appeals: Orders Denying Disqualification of
Counsel Are Not Appealable Pursuant to the Collateral Order Exception, 56 TUL. L. REv. 1035
(1982); Note, Appealability of Orders Denying Attorney Disqualification-A Look Beyond Fire-
stone, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 975.
37. 449 U.S. at 375. (Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, declined to accept
this conclusion, pointing out that the district court is free to reconsider its ruling at any time. Id.
at 380-82 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
38. Id. at 376.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)).
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of a claim of fundamental right that cannot effectively be reviewed fol-
lowing judgment on the merits." '41
The Court next applied the collateral order doctrine to disqualifi-
cation orders in Flanagan v. United States.4 Robert Flanagan and
three other Philadelphia police officers were indicted by a federal grand
jury for civil rights offenses. The defendants jointly retained a law firm
to represent them. Three of the officers subsequently moved to sever
their cases. The district court granted the government's motion to dis-
qualify the law firm from its multiple representation.43 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.44 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that an order disqualifying counsel in a crimi-
nal case is not subject to immediate review.45
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, first noted the
policy reasons for the final judgment rule: to preserve respect for trial
judges by limiting appellate interference, reduce the ability of appel-
lants to harass opponents and clog the courts, and promote efficient
judicial administration."' The Court then emphasized that the policy of
avoiding delay is "at its strongest in the field of criminal law.""' Be-
cause the interests of both the public and the accused are served by
speedy resolution of criminal charges, 8 the collateral order exception
has been interpreted with "utmost strictness" in criminal cases.4 9
Applying the Coopers & Lybrand test, the Court reasoned that at
least one of its conditions would make interlocutory review impermissi-
ble. If, as in some circumstances, prejudice to the defense is presumed
following erroneous disqualification of counsel,5" the order could be ef-
41. Id. at 377.
42. 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
43. United States v. Flanagan, 527 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (district court entitled to
disregard defendants' knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of right to separate counsel).
44. Flanagan v. United States, 679 F.2d 1072 (3rd Cir. 1982) (holding the order disqualify-
ing counsel appealable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule).
45. 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
46. Id. at 263-64.
47. Id. at 264 (quoting United States v. Hollywood Motor Car, 458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982)).
48. 465 U.S. at 264-65. Justice O'Connor indicated that the public interest is reflected in the
effect of time on the prosecution's ability to meet its burden of proof, the costs of pretrial deten-
tion, prolonged anxiety resulting from delays in criminal trials, and prompt acquittal of the
wrongly accused-which results in continued prosecutorial investigation.
49. Id. at 265.
50. The Court noted that obtaining a reversal following violation of a defendant's right does
not require a showing of prejudice where the right reflects constitutional protection of the defend-
ant's free choice, independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding. McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 177, 178 n.8 (1984). Specific prejudice need not be shown where the defendant
is denied counsel altogether. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Prejudice is also pre-
sumed where counsel's request to be replaced because of conflict of interest is denied. Holloway v.
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fectively reviewed after a final judgment.6 1 On the other hand, if a
showing of specific prejudice is required, such a disqualification order
would fail the second part of the Coopers & Lybrand test, since the
order would be intertwined with the merits of the case.
52
Several circuit courts declined to interpret Flanagan as precluding
immediate appeal of orders granting disqualification in civil cases.53
The question was expressly left open in Flanagan; Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. v. Koller54 resolved it.
In Koller, the Court first addressed the policy arguments advanced
by the court of appeals. In spite of Flanagan's emphasis on delay as
anathema in the criminal trial process, the Supreme Court refuted the
circuit court's inference that Flanagan hinged on concerns unique to
criminal cases. The Court noted that preventing delay is a worthwhile
objective in civil as well as criminal cases. Yet, the delay occasioned by
interlocutory appeal would be the likely result of a rule permitting im-
mediate review of disqualification orders as of right.56
The Court recognized that orders granting disqualification result
in delay while new counsel becomes familiar with the case. However,
this delay is inevitable when the district court decision to disqualify is
correct. The delay resulting from the "occasionally erroneous disqualifi-
cation" which is not redressed until appeal from a final judgment was
viewed by the Court as preferable to the delay threatened by piecemeal
review.56
While the circuit court had expressed concern about the disquali-
fied attorneys' interests, the Supreme Court noted that those interests
had not been considered relevant or dispositive in its prior decisions.
The Court added that counsel's interests may not always coincide with
those of the client. As a matter of ethics, the client's interests should
control the litigation. The Court suggested that an attorney whose
reputation has been seriously damaged by disqualification may be able
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
51. 465 U.S. at 268.
52. Id. at 268-69.
53. See. e.g., Interco Systems v. Omni Corporate Services, Inc., 733 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1984)
(citing Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds,
449 U.S. 1106 (1981)); cf. Gibbs v. Paluk, 742 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1984) (Flanagan prohibits
immediate appeal of disqualification orders in civil cases as well as criminal trials).
54. 105 S. Ct. 2757.
55. Id. at 2763.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1981);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1983).
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to obtain relief from the Circuit Judicial Council. 8
The Court did not accept the court of appeals' view that clients
might be left without a remedy if interlocutory review were barred pur-
suant to the final judgment principle. Parties are free to seek certifica-
tion of important issues for interlocutory review under Title 28, section
1292(b) of the United States Code. 9 The Court added that in ex-
traordinary circumstances, a petition for a writ of mandamus may be
proper.60
The Court did not find the court of appeals' concern about the
tactical use of disqualification motions persuasive. When the district
court errs in its task of policing the litigation tactics of counsel, finan-
cial hardship for the disqualified attorney and the client may result.61
However, " '[i]f the expense of litigation were sufficient reason for
granting an exception to the final judgment rule, the exception might
well swallow the rule.' "62
After analyzing the policy considerations, the Court applied the
Coopers & Lybrand test. The circuit court's application of the test was
shaped by its view that reversal on appeal from a final judgment would
require both error in the disqualification decision and a "virtually im-
possible" showing of prejudice from the absence of particular counsel.6 3
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority pointed out that the Su-
preme Court "has never held that prejudice is a prerequisite to reversal
of a judgment following erroneous disqualification of counsel."64 The
Court declined to decide that question, but noted that the issue in such
a case would revolve around the showing required to reverse a final
judgment, not the propriety of interlocutory appeal.65 Indeed, Justice
58. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (1982). The judicial council shall make all necessary and appro-
priate orders for the effective and expeditious administration of justice in their respective circuits.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). The statute provides that a district court may certify an
appeal to the circuit court, which will hear an appeal at its discretion. The statute requires that
the issue on appeal involve a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion, and that immediate appeal will materially advance the termination of the
litigation; see Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88
HARV. L. REV. 607 (1975).
60. See Comment, Use of Extraordinary Writs for Interlocutory Appeals, 44 TENN. L. REV.
137 (1976); Note, Mandamus as a Means of Federal Interlocutory Review, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 301
(1977).
61. 105 S. Ct. at 2763-64.
62. Id. at 2764 (quoting Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 747 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1984)).
63. Koller, 737 F.2d at 1052 (distinguishing Flanagan on the basis of the considerable body
of law concerning ineffective assistance of counsel from which to gauge the effect of disqualifying
counsel in criminal cases).




O'Connor noted, the circuit court's reversal of the disqualification order
before final judgment implied that a showing of prejudice was not
required. 66
Relying on its Flanagan reasoning, the Court again indicated that
either of the final two conditions of the Coopers & Lybrand test would
prevent interlocutory review. If the nature of the right to counsel of
choice is such that it would be violated without specifically demon-
strated prejudice, a pretrial order restricting the right does not meet
the third requirement of the test because the disqualification order is
not "effectively unreviewable" on appeal from the final judgment. 67 In
the alternative, if specifically demonstrated prejudice is a prerequisite
to reversal, then the disqualification order cannot be completely sepa-
rate from the merits of the case." An appellate court could not assess
the injury to the client, if any, until the effect of the disqualification on
the outcome of the litigation could be determined. 69 Under these cir-
cumstances, an appeal of the disqualification ruling would fail if the
client received as effective or better representation from the substitute
counsel.7 0 Yet, the question of whether the client would have received
more satisfactory results with different counsel can hardly be extricated
from the merits of the case.
71
In Koller, the circuit court determined that the record provided an
adequate basis for assessing the disqualification order.72 However, the
Supreme Court pointed out that it had rejected case-by-case determi-
nations of appealability. 73 The Court indicated that disqualification or-
ders, as a class, are not sufficiently separable from the merits of the
cases in which they arise to permit interlocutory review.7 4
Acknowledging that its decision might impose hardship on liti-
gants, the Court declined to shape its holding to avoid hardship. Such a
policy, it said, could lead to a t' 'lack of principled adjudication or per-
haps the ultimate devitalization of the finality rule as enacted by
Congress.' ,,75







72. 737 F.2d at 1064.
73. Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2765.
74. Id. at 2766.
75. Id. (quoting Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1976)).
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the court of appeals' concern over the "disturbing phenomenon" of the
tactical use of disqualification motions .7 He emphasized, however, that
the right to counsel of choice can be protected if appellate courts fulfill
their obligation to set aside verdicts when necessary to vindicate a liti-
gant's rights." He also surmised that the Court's holding might cause a
party considering an abusive disqualification motion to consider the in-
herent risk of jeopardizing an ultimately favorable verdict. 8
Justice Stevens dissented. The author of the Court's opinion in
Coopers & Lybrand characterized orders granting disqualification mo-
tions as "squarely within the classic formulation of an appealable col-
lateral order. '79 Justice Stevens maintained that prejudice to the right
of counsel of choice is suffered as soon as a disqualification order is
granted. To hold otherwise, he indicated, would leave the aggrieved
party with the practically impossible task of demonstrating that a final
outcome had been determined by the disqualification order rather than
some other variable. 80 Yet, Justice Stevens was disturbed by the pros-
pect of a rule which would require a reversal of a final judgment even
when there was no showing of impact on the outcome from the error.,"
By permitting interlocutory review, Justice Stevens would neither re-
quire the appellate court to link the outcome to the error, nor insist
that the circuit court reverse a final judgment in spite of the absence of
such a connection."2 Justice Stevens would assume inherent prejudice
resulting from disqualification of counsel, and by permitting interlocu-
tory review, avoid reversing final judgments when the disqualification is
improper.83
As a practical matter, Koller raises the stakes involved in the tac-
tic of moving to disqualify opposing counsel. 84 Immediate reaction to
the decision suggested that plaintiffs' attorneys would bear most of the
hardship in civil cases.8 5 Koller may also become a factor in decisions
76. Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2767 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id.





84. See Crocker, The Ethics of Moving to Disqualify Counsel for Conflict of Interest, 1979
DUKE L.J. 1310.
85. Austern, Disqualification Motions, 21 TRIAL 15 (1985) (although plaintiffs' attorneys
occasionally file disqualification motions, most of these motions are filed by defendants; the mo-
tions delay discovery and trial, which is rarely in the plaintiff's interest).
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of whether to litigate in state or federal courts.8" Apart from the obvi-
ous effect on attorneys who lose a potential fee, Koller is likely to have
considerable effect on the capability and willingness of some plaintiffs
to continue litigation, or withstand settlement overtures. In addition,
lower courts may perceive the Supreme Court's mention of certification
of appeals and mandamus 87 as an invitation to expand the roles of
those procedures, where disqualification orders are concerned.
Koller also indicates that the Coopers & Lybrand test cannot be
applied in a detached and uniform fashion to provide complete answers
to collateral order exception questions. If the test were dispositive, or
subject to the rigid line-drawing required for uniform application, the
extensive discussion of policy considerations which marks Koller would
have been unnecessary. The difficulties of a mechanical application of
the collateral order exception doctrine are suggested by Stevens' dis-
sent. The author of the Court's opinion in Coopers & Lybrand main-
tained that orders disqualifying counsel present exactly the kind of situ-
ations for which the exception was designed.88 Since the majority and
the dissent purport to apply the same test, it is clear that the strictness
with which the test is applied is critical, and is to be determined only
after a preliminary balancing of competing policy concerns.89
While the Court declined to decide whether prejudice must be
shown to support reversal following disqualification of counsel, the
question must ultimately be addressed. Justice Stevens' discomfort with
the implications of a decision on that point seems warranted, and it
appears that some fine-tuning of the inferences to be drawn from
Koller will be necessary.
Troy Anthony Price
86. In Herron v. Jones, 276 Ark. 483, 637 S.W.2d 569 (1982), the Arkansas Supreme Court
noted the difficulties posed by disqualification orders in federal courts. The court addressed the
issue of interlocutory appeal by amending the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure to make
orders disqualifying counsel subject to immediate review. ARK. R. App. P. 2(a)(8).
87. In American Protection Ins. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, 765 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.
1985), the court of appeals noted that Koller did not find the attorneys' interests dispositive, and
concluded that the circumstances did not warrant the extraordinary response of issuing a writ of
mandamus; cf In re American Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1985), in which
the circuit court treated an appeal pending at the time Koller was decided as an application for
writ of mandamus, and granted the writ to overturn a district court decision refusing to allow the
defendant in a contract case to be represented by his law partner.
88. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2767-68.
89. This analysis conforms with the Court's approach in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 171 (1974); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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